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Abstract
I prove an envelope theorem with a converse: the envelope formula
is equivalent to a first-order condition. Like Milgrom and Segal’s (2002)
envelope theorem, my result requires no structure on the choice set. I
use the converse envelope theorem to extend to abstract outcomes the
canonical result in mechanism design that any increasing allocation is
implementable, and apply this to selling information.
1 Introduction
Envelope theorems are a key tool of economic theory, with important roles in
consumer theory, mechanism design and dynamic optimisation. In blueprint
form, an envelope theorem gives conditions under which optimal decision-
making implies that the envelope formula holds.
In textbook accounts,1 the envelope theorem is typically presented as a
consequence of the first-order condition. The modern envelope theorem of
Milgrom and Segal (2002), however, applies in an abstract setting in which
the first-order condition is typically not even well-defined. These authors
therefore rejected the traditional intuition and developed a new one.
In this paper, I re-establish the intuitive link between the envelope formula
and the first-order condition. I introduce an appropriate generalised first-
order condition that is well-defined in the abstract environment of Milgrom
∗I am grateful to Eddie Dekel, Alessandro Pavan and Bruno Strulovici for guidance and
comments, to Gregorio Curello for invaluable conversations, and to Piotr Dworczak, Matteo
Escudé, Benny Moldovanu, Quitzé Valenzuela-Stookey and an audience at Northwestern
for helpful comments and suggestions.
1E.g. Mas-Colell, Whinston and Green (1995, §M.L).
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and Segal (2002), then prove an envelope theorem with a converse: my
generalised first-order condition is equivalent to the envelope formula.
The converse envelope theorem proves useful for mechanism design. I
use it to establish that the implementability of all increasing allocations, a
canonical result when outcomes are drawn from an interval of R, remains
valid when outcomes are abstract. I apply this result to the problem of a
monopolist selling information (distributions of posteriors).
1.1 Précis
The setting is simple: an agent chooses an action x from a set X to maximise
f(x, t), where t ∈ [0, 1] is a parameter. The set X is abstract: no topological,
linear or measurable structure is required. A decision rule is a map X :
[0, 1] → X that assigns an action X(t) to each parameter t. The value
function associated with a decision rule X is VX(t) := f(X(t), t).
The modern envelope theorem of Milgrom and Segal (2002) states that,
under a regularity assumption on f , any optimal decision rule X induces an
absolutely continuous value function VX which satisfies the envelope formula
V ′X(t) = f2(X(t), t) for a.e. t ∈ (0, 1).
The familiar intuition is as follows. The derivative of the value VX is
V ′X(t) =
d
dmf(X(t+m), t)
∣∣∣∣
m=0
+ f2(X(t), t),
where the first term is the indirect effect via the induced change in the
optimal action, and the second term is the direct effect. Since X is optimal,
it satisfies the first-order condition ddmf(X(t+m), t)
∣∣
m=0 = 0, which yields
the envelope formula. Indeed, a decision rule X satisfies the envelope formula
if and only if it satisfies the first-order condition for a.e. t ∈ (0, 1).
The trouble with this intuition is that since the action set X is abstract
(with no linear or topological structure), the derivative ddmf(X(t+m), t)
∣∣
m=0
is ill-defined in general.
To restore the equivalence of the envelope formula and first-order con-
dition, I first define a generalised first-order condition that is well-defined
in the abstract environment. The outer first-order condition is the following
‘integrated’ variant of the classical first-order condition:
d
dm
∫ t
r
f(X(s+m), s)ds
∣∣∣∣
m=0
= 0 for all r, t ∈ (0, 1).
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I then prove an envelope theorem with a converse: under a regularity
assumption on f , a decision rule X satisfies the envelope formula if and
only if it satisfies the outer first-order condition and induces an absolutely
continuous value function VX . The ‘only if’ part is a novel converse envelope
theorem.
In §3, I apply the converse envelope theorem to mechanism design. There
is a single agent with preferences over physical outcomes y ∈ Y and payments
p ∈ R. Her preferences are indexed in ‘single-crossing’ fashion by t ∈ [0, 1],
and this taste parameter is privately known to her. A canonical result is that
if Y is a interval of R, then all (and only) increasing physical allocations
Y : [0, 1]→ Y can be implemented incentive-compatibly by some payment
schedule P : [0, 1]→ R.
I use the converse envelope theorem to extend this result to a large class
of partially ordered spaces Y of outcomes. The argument runs as follows:
fix an increasing physical allocation Y : [0, 1]→ Y. To implement it, choose
a payment schedule P : [0, 1] → R to make the envelope formula hold.
Then by the converse envelope theorem, the outer first-order condition is
satisfied, which means intuitively that (Y, P ) is locally incentive-compatible.
The single-crossing property of preferences ensures that this translates into
global incentive-compatibility.
I apply this implementability theorem to study the problem of a mono-
polist who sells information. The result implies that any Blackwell-increasing
information allocation is implementable. I argue further that if consumers can
share their information with each other, then only Blackwell-increasing alloc-
ations are implementable. I employ this characterisation of implementability
to substantially simplify the monopolist’s revenue-maximisation problem.
1.2 Related literature
Envelope theorems entered economics through consumer theory (Hotelling,
1932; Roy, 1947; Shephard, 1953), were systematised by Samuelson (1947)
under ‘classical’ assumptions, and were developed in greater generality by
e.g. Danskin (1966, 1967), Silberberg (1974) and Benveniste and Scheinkman
(1979). Milgrom and Segal (2002) discovered that classical-type assumptions
were extraneous, and proved an envelope theorem without them. Subsequent
refinements were obtained by Morand, Reffett and Tarafdar (2015) and
Clausen and Strub (2019).2 ‘Converse’ envelope theorems are almost absent
from this literature, but appear in textbook presentations (e.g. Mas-Colell
2See also Oyama and Takenawa (2018).
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et al. (1995, §M.L)).
The outer first-order condition appears to be novel. It has no clear
relationship to any of the standard derivatives for non-smooth functions.3
2 Theory
In this section, I introduce the setting, the Milgrom–Segal (2002) envelope
theorem, and the classical envelope theorem and converse. I then define the
outer first-order condition, state my envelope theorem and converse, and
prove it.
Notation. We will be working with the unit interval [0, 1], equipped with
the Lebesgue σ-algebra and the Lebesgue measure. The Lebesgue integral
will be used throughout. For r < t in [0, 1], we will write
∫ t
r for the integral
over [r, t], and
∫ r
t for −
∫ t
r . L1 will denote the space of integrable functions
[0, 1]→ R, i.e. those that are measurable and have finite integral. We will
write fi for the derivative of a function f with respect to its ith argument.
Some important definitions and theorems are collected in appendix A:
absolute continuity, Lebesgue’s fundamental theorem of calculus, uniform
integrability, the Vitali convergence theorem, and the ‘AC–UI’ lemma of
Fitzpatrick and Hunt (2015).
2.1 Setting
An agent chooses x ∈ X to maximise f(x, t), where X is some non-empty
set and t ∈ [0, 1] is a parameter (or ‘type’).4 The choice set X is arbitrary; it
need not have any topological or linear structure, for example.
Definition 1. A family {φx}x∈X of functions [0, 1]→ R is uniformly abso-
lutely continuous iff the family of functions{
t 7→ sup
x∈X
∣∣∣∣φx(t+m)− φx(t)m
∣∣∣∣
}
m>0
is uniformly integrable.5
3The closest thing would be the Borel derivative (see Bruckner and Leonard (1966, p.
35)), but it’s only a surface resemblance.
4If instead the parameter lives in a normed vector space, then (as Milgrom and Segal
(2002, footnote 7) point out) the analysis applies unchanged to path derivatives.
5The name ‘uniform absolute continuity’ is inspired by the AC–UI lemma in appendix A,
which states that absolute continuity of a continuous φ is equivalent to uniform integrability
of the family of ‘divided difference’ functions {t 7→ [φ(t+m)− φ(t)]/m}m>0.
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Our maintained assumption will be that the objective varies smoothly,
and (uniformly) not too erratically, with the parameter.
Maintained assumptions. f(x, ·) is differentiable for every x ∈ X , and
the family {f(x, ·)}x∈X is uniformly absolutely continuous.
Remark 1. An easy-to-check sufficient condition for uniform absolute con-
tinuity is as follows: f(x, ·) is absolutely continuous for each x ∈ X , and
there is an ` ∈ L1 such that |f2(x, t)| ≤ `(t) for all x ∈ X and t ∈ (0, 1).
(This is the assumption that Milgrom and Segal (2002) use in their envelope
theorem.) An even stronger sufficient condition is that f2 be bounded.
Example 1. Let X = [0, 1] and f(x, t) = xt. The maintained assumptions
are satisfied since f2(x, t) = x exists and is bounded.
A decision rule is a map X : [0, 1] → X that prescribes an action for
each type. The payoff of type t from following decision rule X is denoted
VX(t) := f(X(t), t).
Definition 2. A decision rule X satisfies the envelope formula iff
VX(t) = VX(0) +
∫ t
0
f2(X(s), s)ds for every t ∈ [0, 1].
Equivalently (by Lebesgue’s fundamental theorem of calculus), the envel-
ope formula is satisfied iff VX is absolutely continuous and
V ′X(t) = f2(X(t), t) for a.e. t ∈ (0, 1).
A decision rule X is called optimal iff at every parameter t ∈ [0, 1], X(t)
maximises f(·, t) on X . Milgrom and Segal’s (2002) envelope theorem is as
follows:
Modern envelope theorem. Under the maintained assumptions, if X is
optimal, then it satisfies the envelope formula.
This is actually a slight refinement of Theorem 2 in Milgrom and Segal
(2002), as these authors impose the sufficient condition in Remark 1 rather
than uniform absolute continuity.6 The result follows from the main theorem
(§2.4), so no proof is necessary.
6Another detail: Milgrom and Segal allow t 7→ arg maxx∈X f(x, t) to be empty on a
null set. This requires them to work with the optimal value function V (t) := supx∈X f(x, t)
rather than with the value VX of an actual decision rule X.
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Example 1 (continued). The envelope formula requires that X(t)t =
∫ t
0 X
for every t ∈ [0, 1], or equivalently X(t) = t−1 ∫ t0 X for all t ∈ (0, 1]. Thus the
decision rules that satisfy the envelope formula are precisely those that are
constant on (0, 1]. This includes all optimal decision rules (which set X = 1
on (0, 1]), but also anti-optimal ones (which choose 0 on (0, 1]).
Example 2. Consider X = [0, 1] and f(x, t) = 13(x − t)3. The derivative
f2(x, t) = −(x− t)2 is bounded, so the maintained assumptions hold.
Any constant decision rule X = k satisfies the envelope formula:
VX(0) +
∫ t
0
f2(X(s), s)ds =
1
3k
3 −
∫ t
0
(k − s)2ds = 13(k − t)
3 = VX(t).
This includes the optimal and anti-optimal decision rules X = 1 and X = 0.
The decision rule X(t) = t, which chooses a saddle point of f(·, t) for each t,
also satisfies the envelope formula:
VX(t) =
1
3(t− t)
3 = 0 = 0−
∫ t
0
(s− s)2ds = VX(0) +
∫ t
0
f2(X(s), s)ds.
There are other decision rules that satisfy the envelope formula, e.g. X(t) =
min{t, t?} for t? ∈ (0, 1).
2.2 Classical envelope theorem and converse
The textbook version of the envelope theorem, which has a natural and intu-
itive converse, holds under additional topological and convexity assumptions.
Classical assumptions. The action set X is a convex subset of Rn, the
action derivative f1 exists and is bounded, and only Lipschitz continuous
decision rules X are considered.
The classical assumptions are strong. Most glaringly, the Lipschitz condi-
tion rules out important decision rules in many applications. In the canonical
auction setting, for instance, the revenue-maximising mechanism is discon-
tinuous (Myerson, 1981).7
Example 1 (continued). X = [0, 1] is a convex subset of R, and f1(x, t) = t
exists and is bounded. If we restrict attention to Lipschitz continuous decision
rules X : [0, 1]→ [0, 1], then the classical assumptions are satisfied.
Given a Lipschitz continuous decision rule X, suppose that type t con-
siders taking the action X(t + m) intended for another type. The map
m 7→ f(X(t+m), t) is differentiable a.e. under the classical assumptions,8
7Even when the classical assumptions are relaxed as much as possible, unless f is trivial,
X still has satisfy a strong continuity requirement. See appendix C.
8Since f(·, t) is differentiable, and X is differentiable a.e. since it is Lipschitz continuous.
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so we may define a first-order condition:
Definition 3. A decision rule X satisfies the first-order condition a.e. iff
d
dmf(X(t+m), t)
∣∣∣∣
m=0
= 0 for a.e. t ∈ (0, 1).
The first-order condition a.e. requires that almost no type t can do better
(or worse) by choosing an action X(t+m) intended for a nearby type t+m.
It does not say that there are no nearby actions that do better (or worse).
Classical envelope theorem and converse. Under the maintained and
classical assumptions, a Lipschitz continuous decision rule satisfies the first-
order condition a.e. iff it satisfies the envelope formula.
Example 1 (continued). A Lipschitz continuous decision rule X is differen-
tiable a.e., so satisfies the first-order condition at t ∈ (0, 1) iff
d
dmX(t+m)t
∣∣∣∣
m=0
= X ′(t)t = 0 for a.e. t ∈ (0, 1).
This requires that X be constant a.e. We saw that the envelope formula
demands that X be constant on (0, 1]. For Lipschitz continuous decision
rules X, both conditions are equivalent to constancy on all of [0, 1].
Proof of the classical envelope theorem and converse. Fix a Lipschitz con-
tinuous decision rule X : [0, 1]→ X . By Lemma 2 in appendix C, VX(t) :=
f(X(t), t) is absolutely continuous, hence differentiable a.e. The map r 7→
f(X(r), t) is differentiable a.e. by the classical assumptions, and t 7→ f(X(r), t)
is differentiable by the maintained assumptions. Hence the a.e.-defined deriv-
ative of VX obeys the differentiation identity
V ′X(t) =
d
dmf(X(t+m), t)
∣∣∣∣
m=0
+ f2(X(t), t) for a.e. t ∈ (0, 1).
It follows that the first-order condition a.e. is equivalent to
V ′X(t) = f2(X(t), t) for a.e. t ∈ (0, 1),
which is in turn equivalent to the envelope formula since VX is absolutely
continuous. 
Example 2 (continued). The classical assumptions are satisfied provided
we restrict attention to Lipschitz continuous decision rules. We saw that the
constant and ‘saddle’ decision rules, which are Lipschitz continuous, satisfy
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the envelope formula. Let us verify that they also satisfy the first-order
condition a.e., as the classical converse envelope theorem demands. For a
constant decision rule X = k, the first-order condition holds (everywhere)
on (0, 1) since ddm
(−13(k − t)3)∣∣m=0 = 0. The ‘saddle’ decision rule X(t) = t
satisfies the first-order condition on (0, 1) since
d
dm
(
−13([t+m]− t)
3
)∣∣∣∣
m=0
= ddm
(
−13m
3
)∣∣∣∣
m=0
= −02 = 0.
There are many decision rules that satisfy the first-order condition a.e.
but violate the envelope formula: for example, step functions like X = 1[t?,1]
for t? ∈ (0, 1]. The classical envelope theorem tells us that any such decision
rule must fail to be Lipschitz continuous.
2.3 The outer first-order condition
Without the classical assumptions, the ‘imitation derivative’
d
dmf(X(t+m), t)
∣∣∣∣
m=0
need not exist, in which case the first-order condition is ill-defined. To
circumvent this problem, we require a novel first-order condition.
Definition 4. A decision rule X satisfies the outer first-order condition iff
d
dm
∫ t
r
f(X(s+m), s)ds
∣∣∣∣
m=0
= 0 for all r, t ∈ (0, 1).
As an intuitive motivation, suppose that types s ∈ [r, t] deviate by
choosing X(s+m) rather than X(s). The aggregate payoff to such a deviation
is
∫ t
r f(X(s+m), s)ds, and the outer first-order condition says (loosely) that
local deviations of this kind are collectively suboptimal.
Example 1 (continued). For any decision rule X that is a.e. constant at
some k ∈ [0, 1], the outer first-order condition holds:
d
dm
∫ t
r
X(s+m)sds
∣∣∣∣
m=0
= ddmk
∫ t
r
sds
∣∣∣∣
m=0
= 0 for all r, t ∈ (0, 1).
This includes many decision rules that fail to be Lipschitz continuous (or
even continuous). In particular, it admits decision rules that are constant
except at zero, which we argued satisfy the envelope formula (p. 6). Decision
rules that are not constant a.e. violate the outer first-order condition.
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As we shall see, the outer first-order condition is well-defined even when
the classical assumptions fail. When they do hold, the outer first-order
condition coincides with the first-order condition a.e.:
Housekeeping lemma. Under the maintained and classical assumptions,
the outer first-order condition is equivalent to the first-order condition a.e.
Proof. Fix a Lipschitz continuous decision rule X : [0, 1]→ X . By Lemma 2
in appendix C, the family{
t 7→ f(X(t+m), t)− f(X(t), t)
m
}
m>0
is convergent a.e. as m ↓ 0 and uniformly integrable. Hence by the Vitali
convergence theorem, for any r, t ∈ (0, 1),
d
dm
∫ t
r
f(X(s+m), s)ds
∣∣∣∣
m=0
=
∫ t
r
d
dmf(X(s+m), s)
∣∣∣∣
m=0
ds.
The left-hand side is zero for all r, t ∈ (0, 1) iff the outer first-order condition
holds. The right-hand side is zero for all r, t ∈ (0, 1) iff the first-order condition
a.e. holds.9 
The term ‘outer’ is inspired by this argument. By taking the differentiation
operator outside the integral, we change nothing in the classical case, and
ensure existence beyond the classical case.
2.4 Envelope theorem and converse
My main result characterises the envelope formula in terms of the outer
first-order condition.
Envelope theorem and converse. Under the maintained assumptions,
for a decision rule X : [0, 1]→ X , the following are equivalent:
(1) X satisfies the outer first-order condition
d
dm
∫ t
r
f(X(s+m), s)ds
∣∣∣∣
m=0
= 0 for all r, t ∈ (0, 1),
and VX(t) := f(X(t), t) is absolutely continuous.
9This relies on the following basic fact (e.g. Proposition 2.23(b) in Folland (1999)): for
φ ∈ L1, we have φ = 0 a.e. iff ∫ t
r
φ = 0 for all r, t ∈ (0, 1).
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(2) X satisfies the envelope formula
VX(t) = VX(0) +
∫ t
0
f2(X(s), s)ds for every t ∈ [0, 1].
The implication (1) =⇒ (2) is an envelope theorem with weak assump-
tions; the modern envelope theorem in §2.1 and the classical envelope theorem
in §2.2 are corollaries.10 The implication (2) =⇒ (1) is the converse envelope
theorem, which entails the classical converse envelope theorem in §2.2.
The absolute-continuity-of-VX condition in (1) ensures that f(X(·), t)
does not behave too erratically near t. A characterisation of this property is
provided in appendix B.
Example 1 (continued). We saw that a decision rule satisfies the envelope
formula iff it is constant on (0, 1] (p. 6), and satisfies the outer first-order
condition iff it is constant a.e. (p. 8). Thus the envelope formula implies the
outer first-order condition. For the converse, observe that an a.e. constant X
for which VX(t) = X(t)t is (absolutely) continuous must in fact be constant
on (0, 1], though not necessarily at zero.
In the classical case, our proof relied on the differentiation identity
V ′X(t) =
d
dmf(X(t+m), t)
∣∣∣∣
m=0
+ f2(X(t), t),
or (rearranged and integrated)∫ t
r
d
dmf(X(s+m), s)
∣∣∣∣
m=0
ds = VX(t)− VX(r)−
∫ t
r
f2(X(s), s)ds.
To pursue an analogous proof, we require an ‘outer’ version of this identity
in which differentiation and integration are interchanged on the left-hand
side. The following lemma does the job.
Identity lemma. Under the maintained assumptions, if VX is absolutely
continuous, then for all r, t ∈ (0, 1),
d
dm
∫ t
r
f(X(s+m), s)ds
∣∣∣∣
m=0
= VX(t)− VX(r)−
∫ t
r
f2(X(s), s)ds, (I)
where both sides are well-defined.
10Unlike the modern envelope theorem in §2.1, the hypotheses of the envelope theorem
(1) =⇒ (2) (in particular, absolute continuity of VX) can be difficult to check in practice.
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Before proving the lemma, let us put it to use. The left-hand side of
(I) is zero for all r, t ∈ (0, 1) iff the outer first-order condition holds. The
right-hand side is zero for all r, t ∈ (0, 1) iff the envelope formula holds.11
Therefore:
Proof of the envelope theorem and converse. Suppose that the outer first-
order condition holds and that VX is absolutely continuous. Then the identity
lemma applies, so the outer first-order condition implies the envelope formula.
Suppose that the envelope formula holds. Then VX is absolutely continu-
ous by Lebesgue’s fundamental theorem of calculus. Hence the identity lemma
applies, so the envelope formula implies the outer first-order condition. 
To prove the identity lemma, we will use the results collected in ap-
pendix A: the AC–UI lemma of Fitzpatrick and Hunt (2015), the Vitali
convergence theorem, and Lebesgue’s fundamental theorem of calculus.
Proof of the identity lemma. For t ∈ [0, 1) and m ∈ (0, 1− t], write
φm(t) :=
VX(t+m)− VX(t)
m
= f(X(t+m), t+m)− f(X(t+m), t)
m︸ ︷︷ ︸
=: ψm(t)
+ f(X(t+m), t)− f(X(t), t)
m︸ ︷︷ ︸
=: χm(t)
.
Fix r, t ∈ (0, 1). Note that
lim
m↓0
∫ t
r
χm =
d
dm
∫ t
r
f(X(s+m), s)ds
∣∣∣∣
m=0
whenever the limit exists. Our task is to show that {∫ tr χm}m>0 is convergent
as m ↓ 0 with limit
VX(t)− VX(r)−
∫ t
r
f2(X(s), s)ds.
{ψm}m>0 need not converge a.e. under the maintained assumptions.12
But
ψ?m(t) :=
f(X(t), t)− f(X(t), t−m)
m
11For the ‘only if’ part, if right-hand side is zero for all r, t ∈ (0, 1), then it is zero for all
r, t ∈ [0, 1] since VX and the integral are continuous, yielding the envelope formula.
12This remains true even under much stronger assumptions. For example, equi-
differentiability of {f(x, ·)}x∈X is not enough: a counter-example is X = [0, 1], f(x, t) =
(t − x)1Q(x) and X(t) = t. (Here 1Q(x) = 1 if x is rational and = 0 otherwise.) In this
case ψm(t) = 1Q(t+m), which is nowhere convergent as m→ 0.
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converges pointwise to t 7→ f2(X(t), t), and by a change of variable,∫ t
r
ψm =
∫ t+m
r+m
ψ?m =
∫ t
r
ψ?m +
(∫ t+m
t
ψ?m −
∫ r+m
r
ψ?m
)
=
∫ t
r
ψ?m + o(1),
where the bracketed terms vanish as m ↓ 0 because {ψ?m}m>0 is uniformly
integrable by the maintained assumptions.
By absolute continuity of VX and the AC–UI lemma in appendix A,
{φm}m>0 is uniformly integrable and converges a.e. to V ′X as m ↓ 0. Since
{ψ?m}m>0 is uniformly integrable and converges pointwise to t 7→ f2(X(t), t),
it follows that
lim
m↓0
∫ t
r
χm = lim
m↓0
∫ t
r
[φm − ψm] = lim
m↓0
∫ t
r
[φm − ψ?m]
=
∫ t
r
lim
m↓0
[φm − ψ?m] =
∫ t
r
[
V ′X(s)− f2(X(s), s)
]
ds,
where the third equality holds by the Vitali convergence theorem. Since VX
is absolutely continuous, Lebesgue’s fundamental theorem of calculus implies
that
∫ t
r V
′
X = VX(t)− VX(r), so
lim
m↓0
∫ t
r
χm = VX(t)− VX(r)−
∫ t
r
f2(X(s), s)ds.
Because the right-hand side is well-defined by the maintained assumptions,
this also shows that {∫ tr χm}m>0 is convergent as m ↓ 0. 
3 Application to mechanism design
A key result in mechanism design is that, under a suitable ‘single-crossing’
assumption on the agent’s preferences, all and only increasing allocations are
implementable. While the ‘only’ part is straightforward, the ‘all’ part has
substance. Existing theorems of this sort require that the physical outcome
be drawn from an interval of R.
In this section, I use the converse envelope theorem to extend this result
to abstract spaces of physical outcomes. After introducing the environment,
I prove the implementability result and a partial converse. I then apply these
to the sale of information by a monopolist.
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3.1 Environment
There is a single agent13 with preferences over physical outcomes y ∈ Y and
payments p ∈ R represented by f(y, p, t). The preference parameter (type)
t ∈ [0, 1] is privately known to the agent. The set Y of physical outcomes is
a partially ordered set, not assumed to possess any topological, measurable
or linear structure. We assume only that it satisfies:
Order assumptions. Y is order-dense-in-itself, countably chain-complete
and chain-separable.14
In words, Y is ‘rich’ (first two assumptions) and ‘not too large’ (final
assumption). Many natural spaces enjoy these properties, including Rn with
the usual (product) order, the space of all integrable functions (random
variables) on any measure (probability) space ordered by ‘a.e. (a.s.) smaller’,
and the space of distributions of (posterior) beliefs (updated from a given
prior) ordered by ‘more informative than’. These assertions are proved in
appendix D, where further examples are also given.
We maintain the following standard assumptions on the agent’s utility f .
(Recall that C ⊆ Y is called a chain iff it is totally ordered.)
Preference assumptions. f(y, ·, t) is strictly decreasing and onto R for
all y ∈ Y and t ∈ [0, 1]. The type derivative f3 exists and is bounded. For
every chain C ⊆ Y, f(·, ·, 0) is continuous on C ×R and {f3(·, ·, t)}t∈[0,1] is
equi-continuous on C ×R when C is given the relative topology inherited
from the order topology on Y.15,16
The existence and boundedness of the type derivative f3 ensures that
the maintained assumptions are satisfied when we embed this model in the
13All of the analysis carries over to the case with multiple agents.
14A set A partially ordered by . is order-dense-in-itself iff for any a < a′ in A, there is
a b ∈ A such that a < b < a′. A subset B ⊆ A is order-dense iff for any a < a′ in A, there
is a b ∈ B such that a . b . a′. A is chain-separable iff for each chain (totally ordered
subset) C ⊆ A, there is a countable set B ⊆ A that is order-dense in C. A is countably
chain-complete iff every countable chain in A with a lower (upper) bound in A possesses
an infimum (a supremum) in A.
15The order topology on Y is the one generated by the open order rays {y′ ∈ Y : y′ < y}
and {y′ ∈ Y : y < y′} for each y ∈ Y, where < denotes the strict part of the order on Y.
16A detail: equi-continuity is a property of functions on a uniformisable topological space.
Y ×R need not be uniformisable under the order assumptions, which is why the equi-
continuity hypothesis is formulated on chains instead. To see that C ×R is uniformisable
for any chain C ⊆ Y, we need only convince ourselves that the relative topology on C
inherited from the order topology on Y is completely regular. This topology is obviously
finer than the order topology on C, so it suffices to show that the latter is completely
regular. And that is (a consequence of) a standard result; see e.g. Cater (2006).
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general setting of §2.1 by letting X := Y×R. The converse envelope theorem
is therefore applicable.
Remark 2. The preference assumptions imply that for any chain C ⊆ Y, f
is (jointly) continuous on C ×R × [0, 1] when C has the relative topology
inherited from the order topology on Y.17
Remark 3. A common special case is quasi-linear preferences f(y, p, t) =
h(y, t)− p. As is well-known, quasi-linearity is a reasonable assumption if the
agent spends a very small fraction of her budget on the physical outcome y,
and not otherwise. We do not impose quasi-linearity.
In addition to the mild preference assumptions, we will employ an eco-
nomically substantive ‘single-crossing’ hypothesis. To state it, we will require
derivatives that are well-defined even for non-differentiable functions:
Definition 5. Let φ be a function [0, 1]→ R. The upper and lower derivat-
ives of φ at t ∈ (0, 1) are, respectively,
D?φ(t) ≡
( d
dm
)?
φ(t+m)
∣∣∣∣
m=0
:= lim sup
m→0
φ(t+m)− φ(t)
m
D?φ(t) ≡
( d
dm
)
?
φ(t+m)
∣∣∣∣
m=0
:= lim inf
m→0
φ(t+m)− φ(t)
m
.
Writing . for the partial order on Y, we call a map Y : [0, 1] → Y
increasing iff we have Y (t) . Y (t′) for any t ≤ t′ in [0, 1].
Definition 6. f satisfies the outer Spence–Mirrlees condition iff for any
increasing Y : [0, 1] → Y and any P : [0, 1] → R, the induced payoff
17To see this, take (x, t) := (y, p, t) and (x′, t′) := (y′, p′, t′) in C ×R × [0, 1] with (wlog)
t ≤ t′, and apply Lebesgue’s fundamental theorem of calculus to obtain
∣∣f(x′, t′)− f(x, t)∣∣ = ∣∣∣∣∣f(x′, 0) +
∫ t′
0
f3(x′, s)ds− f(x, 0)−
∫ t
0
f3(x, s)ds
∣∣∣∣∣
≤
∣∣f(x′, 0)− f(x, 0)∣∣+ ∫ t
0
∣∣f3(x′, s)− f3(x, s)∣∣ds+ ∫ t′
t
∣∣f3(x′, s)∣∣ds.
By continuity of f(·, 0) (equi-continuity of {f3(·, s)}s∈[0,1]), the first (second) term can
be made arbitrarily small by taking x and x′ sufficiently close (formally, choosing x′ in a
neighbourhood of x that is small in the sense of set inclusion). By boundedness of f3, the
third term can similarly be made small by choosing t and t′ close.
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U(s, s′) := f(Y (s), P (s), s′) is such that for any r < t in (0, 1),( d
dm
)
?
∫ t′
r′
U(s+m, s)ds
∣∣∣∣∣
m=0
≥ 0 for all [r′, t′] ⊆ [r, t]
implies
( d
dm
)? ∫ t
r
U(s+m, s+ n)ds
∣∣∣∣
m=0
≥ 0 for all n ∈ (0, 1− t],
and ( d
dm
)? ∫ t′
r′
U(s+m, s)ds
∣∣∣∣∣
m=0
≤ 0 for all [r′, t′] ⊆ [r, t]
implies
( d
dm
)
?
∫ t
r
U(s+m, s+ n)ds
∣∣∣∣
m=0
≤ 0 for all n ∈ [−r, 0).
The outer Spence–Mirrlees condition formalises the idea that higher
types are willing to pay more to increase y ∈ Y. It is the same in spirit
as the classical Spence–Mirrlees assumption, which requires that the slope
f1(y, p, t)/|f2(y, p, t)| of the agent’s indifference curves be increasing in t for
all (y, p) ∈ Y × R. Indeed, I show in appendix E that the outer Spence–
Mirrlees condition is implied by the classical one whenever the latter is
well-defined.
A direct mechanism is a pair of maps Y : [0, 1] → Y and P : [0, 1] →
R that assign a physical outcome and a payment to each type. A direct
mechanism (Y, P ) is called incentive-compatible iff no type strictly prefers
the outcome–payment pair designated for another type:
f(Y (t), P (t), t) ≥ f(Y (r), P (r), t) for all r, t ∈ [0, 1].
By a revelation principle, it is without loss of generality to restrict attention to
incentive-compatible direct mechanisms. A physical allocation Y : [0, 1]→ Y
is called implementable iff there is a payment schedule P : [0, 1]→ R such
that (Y, P ) is incentive-compatible.18
3.2 Increasing allocations are implementable
We shall show that when preferences satisfy the outer Spence–Mirrlees
condition, any increasing allocation Y : [0, 1]→ Y is implementable. Several
results along these lines are known for the special case in which Y is an interval
of R.19 (As in auctions, where y ∈ Y = [0, 1] is the probability with which the
18Adding an individual rationality constraint does not change our results below.
19The exact definition of the Spence–Mirrlees condition varies between papers.
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agent gets the good.) With quasi-linear preferences f(y, p, t) = h(y, t)−p, the
result has been known since Mirrlees (1976) and Spence (1974). Under the
classical assumptions, Guesnerie and Laffont (1984) proved the weaker claim
that all increasing and piecewise continuously differentiable allocations are
implementable. Nöldeke and Samuelson (2018) obtained the result without
either quasi-linearity or the classical assumptions.
Implementability theorem. Under the order and preference assumptions,
if f satisfies the outer Spence–Mirrlees condition, then any increasing physical
allocation is implementable.
It is instructive to compare the hypotheses to those of Nöldeke and
Samuelson (2018, Proposition 13). Whereas they assume that Y is a compact
interval of R, I allow it to be any partially ordered set satisfying the order
assumptions. On the other hand, I require the type derivative f3 to exist,
as this is a prerequisite for the envelope formula to be well-defined. (Their
Spence–Mirrlees condition also differs from mine in form, though not in
spirit.)
The proof is in appendix F. The idea is as follows. Take any increasing
physical allocation Y : [0, 1]→ Y. By the existence lemma in appendix F.1,
there exists a payment schedule P : [0, 1] → R such that (Y, P ) satisfies
the envelope formula. By the converse envelope theorem, it follows that
(Y, P ) is locally incentive-compatible in the sense that it satisfies the outer
first-order condition. The outer Spence–Mirrlees condition ensures that local
incentive-compatibility translates into global incentive-compatibility.
The argument for the final step actually applies only to physical alloc-
ations Y that are suitably continuous. But the order assumptions ensure
(via a lemma in appendix F.3) that any increasing Y can be approximated
by a sequence of suitably continuous and increasing (hence implementable)
physical allocations, and incentive-compatibility is preserved in the limit.
3.3 Implementable allocations are non-decreasing
To complete the picture of implementability, it remains to provide a partial
converse to the implementability theorem. This result has little to do with the
envelope theorem or its converse, so I shall be brief. Call a map pi : Y → R
that assigns a price to each physical outcome y ∈ Y a tariff.
Definition 7. f satisfies the strict Spence–Mirrlees condition iff for any
tariff pi : Y → R, the map (y, t) 7→ f(y, pi(y), t) is strictly single-crossing.20
20A function φ : Y × [0, 1]→ R is strictly single-crossing iff for any y < y′ (where . is
the partial order on Y) and t < t′, φ(y, t) ≤ φ(y′, t) implies φ(y, t′) < φ(y′, t′).
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Letting . denote the partial order on Y , we say that a physical allocation
Y : [0, 1] → Y is non-decreasing iff there are no t ≤ t′ in [0, 1] such that
Y (t′) < Y (t). In other words, Y (t) and Y (t′) could either be ranked as
Y (t) . Y (t′), or they could be incomparable. Increasing maps are non-
decreasing, but the converse is false except if Y is a chain.
Proposition 1. If f(y, ·, t) is strictly decreasing for each y ∈ Y and t ∈ [0, 1],
and f satisfies the strict Spence–Mirrlees condition, then only non-decreasing
allocations are implementable.
The proof is in appendix G. Under the additional hypothesis that Y is
a chain, Proposition 1 yields a full converse: only increasing allocations are
implementable. Combined with the implementability theorem, this yields:
Corollary 1. Under the order and preference assumptions, if f satisfies the
outer and strict Spence–Mirrlees conditions and Y is a chain, then all and
only increasing physical allocations are implementable.
3.4 Selling information
There is a population of consumers with types t ∈ [0, 1], a finite set Ω of
states of the world, and a set A of actions. A type-t consumer earns payoff
U(a, ω, t) if she takes action a ∈ A in state ω ∈ Ω, so her expected value at
belief µ ∈ ∆(Ω) is
V (µ, t) := sup
a∈A
∑
ω∈Ω
U(a, ω, t)µ(ω).
Assume that the type derivative V2 exists and is bounded, and that V2(·, t)
is continuous for each t ∈ [0, 1]. This is slightly stronger than assuming that
the underlying type derivative U3 has the same properties;21 see e.g. Milgrom
and Segal (2002, Theorem 3) for sufficient conditions.
A type-t consumer who makes payment p ∈ R suffers a cost C(p, t). We
suppose that C(·, t) is continuous, strictly increasing and ontoR, and that the
type derivative C2 exists and is bounded with {C2(·, t)}t∈[0,1] equi-continuous.
Consumers share a common prior µ0 ∈ int ∆(Ω). Prior to making her
decision, a consumer may be able to observe the realisation of a random
variable that is correlated with ω (a signal), and thus to form a new (posterior)
belief according to Bayes’s rule. Since the signal is random, the agent’s
posterior is random; write y for its distribution. (y is a Borel probability
21If U3 exists and is bounded, then V2(µ, ·) exists almost everywhere by the Milgrom–
Segal envelope theorem (p. 5), and V2 is bounded by inspection.
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measure on ∆(Ω).) Our agent’s expected payoff under a signal that induces
posterior distribution y, if she makes payment p ∈ R, is
f(y, p, t) :=
∫
∆(Ω)
V (µ, t)y(dµ)− C(p, t).
It is well-known that a Borel probability measure on ∆(Ω) is the posterior
distribution induced by some signal iff it is Bayes-plausible, i.e. its mean∫
∆(Ω)
µy(dµ)
equals µ0.22 Write Y for the set of all Bayes-plausible distributions of pos-
teriors. Order Y by Blackwell informativeness: y . y′ iff∫
∆(Ω)
vdy ≤
∫
∆(Ω)
vdy′
for every continuous and convex v : ∆(Ω) → R. A less informative dis-
tribution of posteriors is precisely one that yields a lower expected payoff∫
∆(Ω) V (µ, t)y(dµ) no matter what the underlying action set A or utility
U(·, ·, t).23 I show in appendix D that Y satisfies the order assumptions.
The preference assumptions are also satisfied: it is clear that f(y, ·, t)
is strictly decreasing and onto R and that f3 exists and is bounded, and
I verify the continuity hypotheses in appendix H. Assume that V (·, t) is
strictly convex,24 so that information is valuable in the sense that y 7→∫
∆(Ω) V (µ, t)y(dµ) is strictly increasing.25 Assume also that higher types
have a higher willingness to pay—precisely, that f satisfies the outer and
strict Spence–Mirrlees conditions.
Example 3 (forecasting). Each agent (‘consumer’) is tasked with announcing
a probabilistic forecast a ∈ A := ∆(Ω) of the state ω ∈ Ω. Ex post, the
22The ‘only if’ direction is trivial. Conversely, for any a Bayes-plausible y ∈ Y, y is
induced by a ∆(Ω)-valued signal whose distribution conditional on each ω ∈ Ω is
pi(M |ω) = 1
µ0(ω)
∫
M
µ(ω)y(dµ) for each Borel-measurable M ⊆ ∆(Ω).
This construction is due to Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011), as is the term ‘Bayes-plausible’.
23The ⇒ direction follows from the fact that V (·, t) is continuous and convex no matter
what A and U are. The converse is proved by showing that any continuous and convex v
can be adequately approximated by V (·, t) for some A and U .
24It is automatically convex; strictness requires that U(·, ·, t) be sufficiently variable.
25The fact that strict convexity of v implies strict monotonicity of y 7→ ∫ vdy is established
in the proof of Proposition 3(d) in appendix D. It is a consequence of Jensen’s inequality.
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public’s assessment of an agent’s quality as a forecaster is some function
of the forecast a and realised state ω (a scoring rule); for concreteness,
a(ω)/‖a‖, where ‖·‖ denotes the Euclidean norm.26 Each agent attaches
some importance t ∈ [0, 1] to being considered a good forecaster, so that
U(a, ω, t) = ta(ω)/‖a‖. Agents are expected-utility maximisers.
It is easily verified that an agent with belief µ ∈ ∆(Ω) optimally announces
forecast a = µ. Her value is then
V (µ, t) =
∑
ω∈Ω
[tµ(ω)/‖µ‖]µ(ω) = t‖µ‖.
By inspection, V2(µ, t) = ‖µ‖ exists, is bounded, and is continuous and
strictly convex in µ.27
To complete the example, we may assume e.g. that C(p, t) = pk for some
k > 0, so that
f(y, p, t) = t
∫
∆(Ω)
‖µ‖y(dµ)− pk.
Clearly agents with a higher t have a higher willingness to pay for information,
so the outer and strict Spence–Mirrlees assumptions are satisfied.
The principal can sell any signal; equivalently, any Bayes-plausible dis-
tribution y ∈ Y of posterior beliefs. An information allocation is a map
Y : [0, 1] → Y that assigns a posterior distribution to each consumer. By
the implementability theorem, every Blackwell-increasing information alloca-
tion is implementable by some mechanism. Proposition 1 tells us that only
Blackwell-non-decreasing information allocations are implementable.
The gap cannot be closed: there exist implementable information alloca-
tions Y which are non-decreasing but not increasing. This means precisely
that some consumer types t < t′ are allocated Blackwell-incomparable in-
formation. But any such information allocation is vulnerable to collusion, as
consumers of types t and t′ would strictly benefit by sharing their informa-
tion.28
26More generally, any bounded and strictly proper scoring rule will do. See e.g. Gneiting
and Raftery (2007) for an introduction to proper scoring rules.
27That ‖·‖ is strictly convex on ∆(Ω) follows from Minkowski’s inequality.
28This holds no matter how the underlying signals giving rise to posterior distributions
Y (t) and Y (t′) are correlated with each other. For by a standard embedding theorem (e.g.
Theorem 7.A.1 in Shaked and Shanthikumar (2007)), Y (t) . Y (t′) is necessary (as well as
sufficient) for there to exist a probability space on which there are random vectors with
laws Y (t) and Y (t′) such that the latter is statistically sufficient for the former. Thus no
matter what the correlation structure of the underlying signals, observing both signals is
strictly more informative than only observing one of them.
19
This possibility tightens incentive-compatibility. In particular, it rules
out precisely those Y : [0, 1]→ Y whose image Y ([0, 1]) ⊆ Y is not a chain.
Let us call an information allocation sharing-proof iff its image is a chain.
Proposition 2. An information allocation is implementable and sharing-
proof if and only if it is increasing.
Proof. An increasing Y : [0, 1]→ Y is implementable by the implementability
theorem, and clearly sharing-proof. If Y is implementable, then Y (t′) ≮ Y (t)
for t < t′ by Proposition 1. If Y is also sharing-proof, then either Y (t) . Y (t′)
or Y (t′) < Y (t) for all t < t′. Thus Y (t) . Y (t′) for t < t′, which is to say
that Y is increasing. 
Remark 4. Using Proposition 2, we may formulate the principal’s revenue-
maximisation problem as a choice between increasing allocations, as in
Myerson (1981). Assume that types t are distributed according to a CDF
F . Each consumer’s outside option is no information, meaning the y ∈ Y
degenerate at the prior µ0; normalise its value to zero for every type t.
(Slightly) strengthen the strict monotonicity of C(·, t) to be uniform in the
sense that for some M > 0, we have
C(p′, t)− C(p, t) ≥M(p′ − p) for any p < p′ in R, y ∈ Y and t ∈ [0, 1],
and strengthen the equi-continuity of {C(·, t)}t∈[0,1] to equi-Lipschitz con-
tinuity.
By Proposition 2, we may break the principal’s problem into the inner
problem of optimally implementing a given increasing Y and the outer
problem of optimally choosing an increasing Y . The inner problem is, for a
given increasing Y ,
sup
P :[0,1]→R
∫ 1
0
PdF s.t. (Y, P ) incentive-compatible and VY,P ≥ 0.
The constraint VY,P ≥ 0 can be weakened to VY,P (0) ≥ 0. Clearly if (Y, P ) is
incentive-compatible, then so is (Y, P + k) for any constant k ∈ R; thus the
principal may freely choose any non-negative value for VY,P (0), so optimally
sets VY,P (0) = 0. This condition and incentive-compatibility together pin
down a unique payment schedule PY .29
29By the Milgrom–Segal envelope theorem, if (Y, P ) is incentive-compatible then it
satisfies the envelope formula. And the latter has exactly one solution with VY,P (0) = 0 by
the uniqueness corollary in appendix F.1, which is applicable on account of the uniform
monotonicity and equi-Lipschitz hypotheses on C.
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The outer problem is to choose the information allocation:
sup
Y :[0,1]→Y
∫ 1
0
PY dF s.t. Y increasing.
Although this represents a simplification, the outer problem is not as tractable
as in Myerson (1981). First, unless we assume quasi-linearity, the dependence
of PY on Y cannot typically be expressed in closed form.30 Second, since Y
is not a chain, the constraint set is (much) larger.
Appendix to the theory (§2)
A Mathematical background
Two properties of functions are important in this paper. Firstly, we some-
times wish to write a function as the integral of its derivative. Secondly, we
sometimes wish to interchange limits and integrals.
For the first property, Lebesgue’s fundamental theorem of calculus states
that a function equals the integral of its derivative iff it is absolutely con-
tinuous.
Definition 8. A function φ : [0, 1] → R is absolutely continuous iff for
each ε > 0, there is δ > 0 such that for any finite collection {(rn, tn)}Nn=1 of
disjoint intervals of [0, 1],
N∑
n=1
(tn − rn) < δ implies
N∑
n=1
|φ(tn)− φ(rn)| < ε.
Absolute continuity implies continuity and differentiability a.e., but the
converse is false. Absolute continuity is implied by Lipschitz continuity.
Lebesgue’s fundamental theorem of calculus. Let φ be a function
[0, 1]→ R. The following are equivalent:
(1) φ is absolutely continuous.
(2) φ is differentiable a.e., and
φ(t) = φ(0) +
∫ t
0
φ′ for every t ∈ [0, 1].
30In general, all we can say is that PY is the unique solution P : [0, 1] → R of the
integral equation h(Y (t), t)−C(P (t), t) = ∫ t0 [h2(Y (s), s)−C2(P (s), s)]ds, where h(y, t) :=∫
∆(Ω) V (·, t)dy. In the quasi-linear special case C(p, t) = p, the solution has the closed
form PY (t) = h(Y (t), t)−
∫ t
0 h2(Y (s), s)ds.
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For the second property, the Vitali convergence theorem states that limits
and integrals can be interchanged iff uniform integrability holds. (Lebesgue’s
dominated convergence theorem is a corollary.)
Definition 9. A family Φ ⊆ L1 is uniformly integrable iff for each ε > 0,
there is δ > 0 such that∫ t+δ
t
|φ| < ε for all t ∈ [0, 1− δ] and φ ∈ Φ.
Vitali convergence theorem. Let {φn}n∈N be a sequence in L1 converging
a.e. to φ : [0, 1]→ R. The following are equivalent:
(1) {φn}n∈N is uniformly integrable.
(2) φ ∈ L1, and
lim
n→∞
∫ t
r
φn =
∫ t
r
φ for all r, t ∈ [0, 1].
Absolute continuity and uniform integrability are closely related. The
following is due to Fitzpatrick and Hunt (2015):
AC–UI lemma. Let φ be a continuous function [0, 1]→ R. The following
are equivalent:
(1) φ is absolutely continuous.
(2) The family of ‘divided difference’ functions{
t 7→ φ(t+m)− φ(t)
m
}
m>0
is uniformly integrable.
B A characterisation of absolute continuity of the value
The following lemma characterises the absolute-continuity-of-VX condition
that appears in the main theorem (p. 9). Apart from its independent interest,
it is needed to prove Lemma 2 in appendix C.
Lemma 1. Under the maintained assumptions, the following are equivalent:
(1) VX(t) := f(X(t), t) is absolutely continuous.
22
(2) The family {χm}m>0 is uniformly integrable, where
χm(t) :=
f(X(t+m), t)− f(X(t), t)
m
.
In the classical case, (2) is imposed (it follows from the classical assump-
tions). In the modern case, (1) arises within the theorem. Both are clearly
joint restrictions on f and X.
Proof. As in the proof of the identity lemma (p. 11), for t ∈ [0, 1) and
m ∈ (0, 1− t], write
φm(t) :=
VX(t+m)− VX(t)
m
= f(X(t+m), t+m)− f(X(t+m), t)
m︸ ︷︷ ︸
=: ψm(t)
+ f(X(t+m), t)− f(X(t), t)
m︸ ︷︷ ︸
= χm(t)
.
{ψm}m>0 is uniformly integrable by the maintained assumption of uniform
absolute continuity. By the AC–UI lemma in appendix A, (1) is equivalent
to {φm}m>0 being uniformly integrable.
Suppose that {χm}m>0 is uniformly integrable, and fix ε > 0. Let δ > 0
meet the ε/2-challenge for both {ψm}m>0 and {χm}m>0; then for any t ∈
[0, 1− δ) and m > 0,∫ t+δ
t
|φm| ≤
∫ t+δ
t
|ψm|+
∫ t+δ
t
|χm| < ε2 +
ε
2 = ε,
showing that {φm}m>0 is uniformly integrable.
An almost identical argument establishes that uniform integrability of
{φm}m>0 implies uniform integrability of {χm}m>0. 
C Results under the classical assumptions
The following lemma is used in the proof of the classical envelope theorem
and converse (p. 7).
Lemma 2. Fix a decision rule X : [0, 1]→ X , and let
χm(t) :=
f(X(t+m), t)− f(X(t), t)
m
.
(1) Under the maintained and classical assumptions, {χm}m>0 is uniformly
integrable.
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(2) Under the maintained assumptions, the following are equivalent:
(a) {χm}m>0 is uniformly integrable and convergent a.e. as m ↓ 0.
(b) VX(t) := f(X(t), t) is absolutely continuous, and
d
dmf(X(t+m), t)
∣∣∣∣
m=0
exists for a.e. t ∈ (0, 1).
The proof of the classical envelope theorem and converse (p. 7) requires
precisely absolute continuity of VX (so that the envelope formula can be
satisfied) and the a.e. existence of ddmf(X(t+m), t)|m=0 (so that the first-
order condition a.e. is well-defined). Part (2) therefore tells us that the
classical assumptions can be weakened to uniform integrability and a.e.
convergence of {χm}m>0, and no further. For f non-trivial, the uniform
integrability part involves a strong continuity requirement on X.31
Proof. For (1), write L > 0 for the constant that bounds f1, and K > 0 for
the Lipschitz constant of X. For any t ∈ [0, 1) and m ∈ (0, 1− t], we have
|χm(t)| =
∣∣∣∣∣ 1m
∫ X(t+m)
X(t)
f1(x, t)dx
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ 1m
∫ X(t)∨X(t+m)
X(t)∧X(t+m)
|f1(x, t)|dx
≤ 1
m
L‖X(t+m)−X(t)‖1 ≤
1
m
LKm = LK.
This shows that {χm}m>0 is uniformly bounded, so a fortiori uniformly
integrable.
For (2), absolute continuity of VX is equivalent to uniform integrability
of {χm}m>0 by Lemma 1 in appendix B, and a.e. existence of ddmf(X(t +
m), t)|m=0 is definitionally equivalent to a.e. convergence of {χm}m>0. 
31For example, consider X = [0, 1], f(x, t) = x and X(t) = 1[t?,1], where t? ∈ (0, 1). Then
given m > 0, we have χm(t) = 1/m for all t ∈ [t? −m, t?]. Suppose toward a contradiction
that {χm}m>0 is uniformly integrable, and let δ > 0 meet the ε-challenge for ε ∈ (0, 1).
For all m ∈ (0, δ/2), we have∫ t?+δ/2
t?−δ/2
|χm| ≥
∫ t?
t?−m
|χm| = m/m = 1 > ε,
a contradiction. This example clearly generalises: the gist is that uniform integrability of
{χm}m>0 is incompatible with non-removable discontinuities in X unless f is trivial.
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Appendix to the application (§3)
D Some spaces that satisfy the order assumptions
Proposition 3. The following partially ordered sets satisfy the order as-
sumptions (p. 13):
(a) Rn equipped with the usual (product) order: (y1, . . . , yn) . (y′1, . . . , y′n)
iff yi ≤ y′i for every i ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
(b) The space `1 of summable sequences equipped with the product order:
(yi)i∈N . (y′i)i∈N iff yi ≤ y′i for every i ∈ N.
(c) For any measure space (Ω,F , µ), the space L1(Ω,F , µ) of (equivalence
classes of a.e. equal) integrable functions Ω→ R, equipped with the
partial order . defined by y . y′ iff y ≤ y′ µ-a.e.
(Special case: for any probability space, the space of finite-expectation
random variables, ordered by ‘a.s. smaller’.)
(d) For any finite set Ω and probability µ0 ∈ ∆(Ω), the space of mean-
µ0 Borel probability measures on ∆(Ω), equipped with the Blackwell
informativeness order . defined by y . y′ iff
∫
∆(Ω) vdy ≤
∫
∆(Ω) vdy′
for every continuous and convex v : ∆(Ω)→ R.32
(e) The open intervals of (0, 1) (including ∅), ordered by set inclusion ⊆.
We will use the following sufficient condition for chain-separability.
Lemma 3. If there is a strictly increasing function Y → R, then Y is
chain-separable.
The converse is false: there are chain-separable spaces that admit no
strictly increasing function.
Proof. Suppose that φ : Y → R is a strictly increasing function, and let
Y ⊆ Y be a chain; we will show that Y has a countable order-dense subset.
By inspection, the restriction φ|Y of φ to Y is an order-embedding of Y into
R; thus Y is order-isomorphic to a subset of R (namely φ(Y )). The order-
isomorphs of subsets of R are precisely those chains that have a countable
order-dense subsets (see e.g. Theorem 24 in Birkhoff (1967, p. 200)); thus Y
has a countable order-dense subset. 
32A proof that this . is a partial order (in particular, anti-symmetric) may be found in
Müller (1997, Theorem 5.2).
25
Proof of Proposition 3(a)–(c). Rn is exactly
L1
(
{1, . . . , n}, 2{1,...,n}, c
)
,
where c is the counting measure; similarly, `1 is L1 (N, 2N, c). It therefore
suffices to establish (c).
So fix a measure space (Ω,F , µ), and let Y := L1(Ω,F , µ) be ordered by
‘µ-a.e. smaller’. Y is order-dense-in-itself since if y ≤ y′′ µ-a.e. and y < y′′
on a set of positive µ-measure, then y′ := (y + y′′)/2 lives in Y and satisfies
y ≤ y′ ≤ y′′ µ-a.e. and y < y′ < y′′ on a set of positive µ-measure.
For countable-chain completeness, take any countable chain Y ⊆ Y, and
suppose that it has a lower bound y ∈ Y; we will show that Y has an
infimum. (The argument for upper bounds is symmetric.) Define y? : Ω→ R
by y?(ω) := infy∈Y y(ω) for each ω ∈ Ω; it is well-defined (i.e. it maps into
R, with the possible exception of a µ-null set) since Y has a lower bound.
Clearly y′ ≤ y? ≤ y′′ µ-a.e. for any lower bound y′ of Y and any y′′ ∈ Y , so
it remains only to show that y? lives in Y, meaning that it is measurable
and that its integral is finite. Measurability obtains since Y is countable (e.g.
Proposition 2.7 in Folland (1999)). As for the integral, since y ≤ y? ≤ y0
µ-a.e. and y and y0 are integrable (live in Y), we have
−∞ <
∫
Ω
ydµ ≤
∫
Ω
y?dµ ≤
∫
Ω
y0dµ < +∞.
For chain-separability, define φ : Y → R by
φ(y) :=
∫
Ω
ydµ for each y ∈ Y.
Observe that φ is strictly increasing: if y ≤ y′ µ-a.e. and y 6= y′ on a
set of positive µ-measure, then φ(y) < φ(y′). Chain-separability follows by
Lemma 3. 
Proof of Proposition 3(d). Fix a finite set Ω and a probability µ0 ∈ ∆(Ω),
and let Y be the space of Borel probability measures with mean µ0, equipped
with the Blackwell informativeness order .. Y is order-dense-in-itself because
if y, y′′ ∈ Y satisfy ∫∆(Ω) vdy ≤ ∫∆(Ω) vdy′′ for every continuous and convex
v : ∆(Ω)→ R, with the inequality strict for some v = v̂, then y′ := (y+y′′)/2
also lives in Y and satisfies∫
∆(Ω)
vdy ≤
∫
∆(Ω)
vdy′ ≤
∫
∆(Ω)
vdy′′
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for every continuous and convex v : ∆(Ω)→ R, with both inequalities strict
for v = v̂.
For countable chain-completeness, let Y ⊆ Y be a countable chain with
an upper bound in Y; we will show that it has a supremum. (The argument
for infima is analogous.) This is trivial if Y has a maximum element, so
suppose not. Then there is a strictly increasing sequence (yn)n∈N in Y that
has no upper bound in Y .33 This sequence is trivially tight since ∆(Ω) is a
compact metric space, so has a weakly convergent subsequence (ynk)k∈N by
Prokhorov’s theorem;34 call the limit y?. Thus by the monotone convergence
theorem for real numbers and the definition of weak convergence, we have for
every for every continuous (hence bounded) and convex v : ∆(Ω)→ R that
sup
y∈Y
∫
∆(Ω)
vdy = lim
k→∞
∫
∆(Ω)
vdynk =
∫
∆(Ω)
vdy?
which is to say that y? is the supremum of Y .
For chain-separability, it suffices by Lemma 3 to identify a strictly in-
creasing function Y → R. Let v be any strictly convex function ∆(Ω)→ R,
and define φ : Y → R by φ(y) := ∫∆(Ω) vdy. Take y < y′ in Y ; we must show
that φ(y) < φ(y′). By a standard embedding theorem (e.g. Theorem 7.A.1
in Shaked and Shanthikumar (2007)), there exists a probability space on
which there are random vectors X,X ′ with respective laws y, y′ such that
E(X ′|X) = X a.s. and X 6= X ′ with positive probability. Thus
φ(y′) =
∫
∆(Ω)
vdy′ = E(v(X ′)) = E(E[v(X ′)|X])
> E(v(E[X ′|X])) = E(v(X)) =
∫
∆(Ω)
vdy = φ(y)
by Jensen’s inequality. 
Proof of Proposition 3(e). The argument is similar to that for R2. Write Y
for the open intervals of (0, 1). Y is order-dense-in-itself since if (a, b) ( (a′′, b′′)
then
(a′, b′) :=
(
a+ a′′
2 ,
b+ b′′
2
)
is an open interval (lives in Y) and satisfies (a, b) ( (a′, b′) ( (a′′, b′′).
33That is, yn < yn+1 for every n ∈ N, and for any y ∈ Y we have y < yn for some
n ∈ N.
34E.g. Theorem 5.1 in Billingsley (1999).
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For countable chain-completeness, we must show that every countable
chain has an infimum and supremum. So take a (countable) chain Y ⊆ Y,
define y? := ⋃y∈Y y, and let y? be the interior of ⋂y∈Y y. Both are open
intervals, so live in Y. Clearly y ⊆ y? ⊆ y+ for any y ∈ Y and any set
y+ containing every member of Y , so y? is the supremum of Y . Similarly
y? ⊆ ⋂y′∈Y y′ ⊆ y for any y ∈ Y , and y− ⊆ y? for any open set y− contained
in every member of Y since y? is by definition the ⊆-largest open set contained
in ⋂y∈Y y.
For chain-separability, define φ : Y → R by
φ((a, b)) := b− a for each open interval (a, b) ∈ Y.
φ is clearly strictly increasing, giving us chain-separability by Lemma 3. 
E The classical and outer Spence–Mirrlees conditions
The outer Spence–Mirrlees condition is implied by the classical Spence–
Mirrlees condition whenever the latter is well-defined:
Proposition 4. Under the preference assumptions (p. 13) and classical
assumptions (p. 6), the classical Spence–Mirrlees condition implies the outer
Spence–Mirrlees condition.
Proof. Take Y : [0, 1] → Y increasing and P : [0, 1] → R, both of which
must be Lipschitz continuous by the classical assumptions. Define U(r, t) :=
f(Y (r), P (r), t). Recall from §2.2 that U(·, t) is differentiable a.e. and that
differentiation and integration may be interchanged. Thus for any r < t in
(0, 1) and m,n ∈ [−r, 1− t], the map
m 7→
∫ t
r
U(s+m, s+ n)ds
is a.e. differentiable (its upper and lower derivatives coincide) with derivative
m 7→
∫ t
r
U1(s+m, s+ n)ds.
Assume that the classical Spence–Mirrlees condition holds, and compute
for n ∈ [0, 1− t] (where all derivatives are defined a.e.)
U1(s, s+ n) = f1(Y (s), P (s), s+ n)Y ′(s) + f2(Y (s), P (s), s+ n)P ′(s)
= |f2(Y (s), P (s), s+ n)|
(
f1(Y (s), P (s), s+ n)
|f2(Y (s), P (s), s+ n)|Y
′(s) + P ′(s)
)
.
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The ratio is increasing in n by the classical Spence–Mirrlees condition, and
Y ′ ≥ 0 since Y is increasing. It follows that U1(s, ·) is ‘single-crossing’ in the
sense that for n′ >(<) n, U1(s, s+ n) ≥(≤) 0 implies U1(s, s+ n′) ≥(≤) 0.
To establish the first part of the outer Spence–Mirrlees condition (the
proof of the second is analogous), fix r < t in (0, 1), and assume the hypo-
thesis:∫ t′
r′
U1(s, s)ds =
( d
dm
)
?
∫ t′
r′
U(s+m, s)ds
∣∣∣∣∣
m=0
≥ 0 ∀[r′, t′] ⊆ [r, t].
This is equivalent to U1(s, s) ≥ 0 for a.e. s ∈ [r, t]. By the ‘single-crossing’
property of U1(s, ·), it follows that U1(s, s + n) ≥ 0 for a.e. s ∈ [r, t] and
every n ∈ (0, 1− t]. Equivalently, for every n ∈ (0, 1− t],( d
dm
)? ∫ t′
r′
U(s+m, s+ n)ds
∣∣∣∣∣
m=0
=
∫ t
r
U1(s, s+ n)ds ≥ 0. 
F Proof of the implementability theorem (p. 16)
The proof relies on three lemmata. We state and prove these in turn in
§F.1–F.3, then prove the theorem in §F.4.
F.1 Solutions of the envelope formula
This appendix provides conditions for the existence and uniqueness of solu-
tions of the envelope formula. Existence is required in step 1 of the proof
of the implementability theorem, where we are given a physical allocation
Y and seek a payment schedule P such that (Y, P ) satisfies the envelope
formula. Uniqueness is used in Remark 4 in §3.4.
Existence lemma. Assume that for all (y, t) ∈ Y× [0, 1], f(y, ·, t) is strictly
decreasing, continuous and ontoR. Further assume that the type derivative f3
exists and is bounded, and that f3(y, ·, t) is continuous for all (y, t) ∈ Y×[0, 1].
Then for any k ∈ R and any physical allocation Y : [0, 1] → Y such that
t 7→ f(Y (t), p, t) and t 7→ f3(Y (t), p, t) are Borel-measurable for every p ∈ R,
there exists a payment schedule P : [0, 1]→ R such that (Y, P ) satisfies the
envelope formula with VY,P (0) = k.
Remark 5. The following corollary may prove useful elsewhere: suppose
in addition that Y is equipped with some topology such that f(·, p, t) and
f3(·, p, t) are Borel-measurable and f3(y, p, ·) is continuous. Then for any
Borel-measurable physical allocation Y : [0, 1] → Y, there is a payment
schedule P such that (Y, P ) satisfies the envelope formula.
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The existence lemma is immediate from the following abstract result by
letting φ(p, t) := f(Y (t), p, t) and ψ(p, t) := f3(Y (t), p, t).
Lemma 4. Let φ and ψ be functions R × [0, 1]→ R. Suppose that φ(·, t)
is strictly decreasing, continuous, and onto R for every t ∈ [0, 1], and that ψ
is bounded with ψ(·, t) continuous for every t ∈ [0, 1]. Further assume that
φ(p, ·) and ψ(p, ·) are Borel-measurable for each p ∈ R. Then for any k ∈ R,
there is a function P : [0, 1]→ R such that
φ(P (t), t) = k +
∫ t
0
ψ(P (s), s)ds for every t ∈ [0, 1].
Proof. Since φ(·, t) is strictly decreasing and continuous, it possesses a con-
tinuous inverse φ−1(·, t), well-defined on all of R since φ(R, t) = R. We may
therefore define a function χ : R × [0, 1]→ R by
χ(w, t) := ψ
(
φ−1(w, t), t
)
for each w ∈ R and t ∈ [0, 1].
χ(·, t) is continuous since ψ(·, t) and φ−1(·, t) are, χ is bounded since ψ is,
and χ(w, ·) is Borel-measurable since ψ(·, t) is continuous and ψ(p, ·) and
φ−1(w, ·) are Borel-measurable.35
Fix k ∈ R. Consider the integral equation
W (t) = k +
∫ t
0
χ(W (s), s)ds for t ∈ [0, 1],
where W is an unknown function [0, 1] → R. Since χ(·, t) is continuous
and χ(w, ·) bounded and Borel-measurable, there is a local solution by
Carathéodory’s existence theorem;36 call it V . By boundedness of χ and a
comparison theorem,37 V can be extended to a solution on all of [0, 1].
Now define P (t) := φ−1(V (t), t). For every t ∈ [0, 1], it satisfies
φ(P (t), t) = V (t) = k +
∫ t
0
χ(V (s), s)ds = k +
∫ t
0
ψ(P (s), s)ds. 
Uniqueness corollary. Under the hypotheses of the existence lemma, if in
addition {f3(y, ·, t)}(y,t)∈Y×[0,1] is equi-Lipschitz continuous and the mono-
tonicity of f(y, ·, t) is uniform in the sense that for some M > 0, we have
f(y, p, t)− f(y, p′, t) ≥M(p′− p) for any p < p′ in R, y ∈ Y and t ∈ [0, 1],
35The claim that φ−1(w, ·) is Borel-measurable for each w ∈ R is equivalent to the
assertion that {t ∈ [0, 1] : φ−1(w, t) > p} = {t ∈ [0, 1] : φ(p, t) > w} is a Borel set for any
p, w ∈ R. And it is, since φ(p, ·) is Borel-measurable for each p ∈ R.
36See e.g. Theorem 5.1 in Hale (1980, ch. 1).
37See e.g. Theorem 2.17 in Teschl (2012).
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then there is for each k ∈ R exactly one payment schedule such that (Y, P )
satisfies the envelope formula with VY,P (0) = k.
Proof. Return to the proof of the existence lemma. The additional assump-
tions ensure, respectively, that {ψ(·, t)}t∈[0,1] and {φ−1(·, t)}t∈[0,1] are equi-
Lipschitz continuous. In follows that {χ(·, t)}t∈[0,1] is equi-Lipschitz continu-
ous, which ensures uniqueness.38 
F.2 Monotonicity from derivatives
The following relationship between monotonicity and upper/lower derivatives
is used in the proof of the implementability theorem:
Monotonicity lemma. If φ : [0, 1] → R is continuous with D?φ ≥ 0
(D?φ ≤ 0) on (0, 1), then it is increasing (decreasing).
This follows from a standard property of Dini derivatives—see e.g. The-
orem 1.14 in Giorgi and Komlósi (1992).
F.3 Continuous approximation of increasing maps
The second step in the proof of the implementability theorem relies on
approximating an increasing map [0, 1]→ Y with continuous and increasing
maps. This is made possible by the following:
Approximation lemma. Let Y satisfy the order assumptions, and let Y
be an increasing map [0, 1]→ Y. The image Y ([0, 1]) may be embedded in
a chain C ⊆ Y with inf C = Y (0) and supC = Y (1) that is order-dense-
in-itself, order-complete and order-separable.39 Furthermore, there exists a
sequence (Yn)n∈N of maps [0, 1] → C converging pointwise to Y , each of
which coincides with Y on {0, 1}, is increasing, and is continuous when C
has the relative topology inherited from the order topology on Y.
The proof is rather long.
Proof. Let Y : [0, 1]→ Y be increasing. Then Y ([0, 1]) is a chain. The result
is trivial if Y ([0, 1]) is a singleton, so suppose not.
We will first show (steps 1–3) that Y ([0, 1]) may be embedded in a chain
C ⊆ Y with inf C = Y (0) and supC = Y (1) that is order-dense-in-itself,
38See e.g. Theorem 5.3 in Hale (1980, ch. 1).
39C ⊆ Y is order-complete iff every subset with a lower (upper) bound has an infimum
(supremum), and order-separable iff it has a countable order-dense subset.
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order-complete and order-separable. We will then argue (step 4) that this
chain C is order-isomorphic and homeomorphic to the unit interval, allowing
us to treat Y as a function [0, 1]→ [0, 1].
Step 1: construction of C. Write . for the partial order on Y. Define
Y ′ to be the set of all outcomes y′ ∈ Y that are .-comparable to every
y ∈ Y ([0, 1]) and that satisfy Y (0) . y′ . Y (1).
We claim that Y ′ is order-dense-in-itself. Suppose to the contrary that
there are y < y′′ in Y ′ for which no y′ ∈ Y ′ satisfies y < y′ < y′′. Observe
that by definition of Y ′, any x ∈ Y ([0, 1]) must be comparable to both y and
y′′, so that {
x ∈ Y ([0, 1]) : x . y or y′′ . x} = Y ([0, 1]).
Since it is order-dense-in-itself, the grand space Y does contain an outcome
y′ such that y < y′ < y′′. Since . is transitive (being a partial order), it
follows that y′ is comparable to every element of{
x ∈ Y : x . y or y′′ . x} ⊇ {x ∈ Y ([0, 1]) : x . y or y′′ . x} = Y ([0, 1]).
But then y′ lies in Y ′ by definition of the latter—a contradiction.
Clearly Y (1) is an upper bound of any chain in Y ′. It follows by the
Hausdorff maximality principle (which is equivalent to the Axiom of Choice)
that there is a chain C ⊆ Y ′ that is maximal with respect to set inclusion.
(That is, C ∪ {y} fails to be a chain for every y ∈ Y ′ \ C.)
Step 2: easy properties of C. By definition of Y ′, any maximal chain in
Y ′ (in particular, C) contains Y ([0, 1]) and has infimum Y (0) and supremum
Y (1).
To see that C is order-dense-in-itself, assume toward a contradiction that
there are c < c′′ for which no c′ ∈ C satisfies c < c′ < c′′, so that (since C is
a chain)
{c′ ∈ C : c′ . c} ∪ {c′ ∈ C : c′′ . c′} = C.
Because Y ′ is order-dense-in-itself, there is a y′ ∈ Y ′ \ C with c < y′ < c′′. It
follows by transitivity of . that y′ is comparable to every element of
{c′ ∈ C : c′ . c} ∪ {c′ ∈ C : c′′ . c′} = C.
But then C ∪ {y′} is a chain in Y ′, contradicting the maximality of C.
To establish that C is order-separable, we must find a countable order-
dense subset of C. Because the grand space Y is chain-separable, it contains
a countable set K that is order-dense in C. Since C is a chain contained in
{y ∈ Y : Y (0) . y . Y (1)} ,
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we may assume without loss of generality that every k ∈ K satisfies Y (0) .
k . Y (1) and is comparable to every element of C. It follows that K is
contained in Y ′ (by definition of the latter). We claim that K is contained
in C. Suppose to the contrary that there is a k ∈ K that does not lie in C;
then C ∪ {k} is a chain in Y ′, which is absurd since C is maximal.
Step 3: order-completeness of C. Since every subset of C has a lower and
an upper bound (viz. Y (0) and Y (1), respectively), what must be shown is
that every subset of the chain C has an infimum and a supremum in C. To
that end, take any subset C ′ of C, necessarily a chain.
We will first (step 3(a)) show that if inf C ′ exists in Y , then it must lie in
C. We will then (step 3(b)) construct a countable chain C ′′′ ⊆ C ′, for which
inf C ′′′ exists in Y by countable-chain completeness of Y , and show that it is
also the infimum in Y of C ′. We omit the analogous arguments for supC ′.
Step 3(a): inf C ′ ∈ C if the former exists in Y . Suppose that inf C ′ exists
in Y . We claim that it lies in Y ′, meaning that Y (0) . inf C ′ . Y (1) and that
inf C ′ is comparable to every y ∈ Y ([0, 1]). The former condition is clearly
satisfied. For the latter, since inf C ′ is a lower bound of C ′, transitivity of
. ensures that it is comparable to every y ∈ Y ([0, 1]) such that c′ . y for
some c′ ∈ C ′. To see that inf C ′ is also comparable to every y ∈ Y ([0, 1])
with y < c′ for every c′ ∈ C ′, note that any such y is a lower bound of C ′.
Since inf C ′ is the greatest lower bound, we must have y . inf C ′, showing
that inf C ′ is comparable to y.
Now to show that inf C ′ lies in C, decompose the chain C as
C = {c ∈ C : c . c′ for every c′ ∈ C ′} ∪ {c ∈ C : c′ < c for some c′ ∈ C ′}
= {c ∈ C : c . inf C ′} ∪ {c ∈ C : inf C ′ < c}.
Clearly inf C ′ is comparable to every element of C, and we showed that it
lies in Y ′. Thus C ∪ {inf C ′} is a chain in Y ′, which by maximality of C
requires that inf C ′ ∈ C.
Step 3(b): inf C ′ exists in Y. By essentially the same construction as we
used to embed Y ([0, 1]) in Y ′ in step 1, C ′ may be embedded in a chain
C ′′ ⊆ C that is order-dense-in-itself such that for every c′′ ∈ C ′′, we have
c′0 . c′′ . c′1 for some c′0, c′1 ∈ C ′. By order-separability of C, C ′′ has a
countable order-dense subset C ′′′, necessarily a chain. By countable chain-
completeness of Y, inf C ′′′ exists in Y. We will show that it is the greatest
lower bound of C ′.
Observe that inf C ′′′ is a lower bound of C ′′ since C ′′′ is order-dense in
C ′′. There can be no greater lower bound of C ′′ since C ′′′ ⊆ C ′′. Thus inf C ′′
exists in Y and equals inf C ′′′.
33
Since inf C ′′ is a lower bound of C ′′ ⊇ C ′, it is a lower bound of C ′. On
the other hand, by construction of C ′′, we may find for every c′′ ∈ C ′′ a
c′ ∈ C ′ such that c′ . c′′, so there cannot be a greater lower bound of C ′.
Thus inf C ′′ is the greatest lower bound of C ′ in Y.
Step 4: identification of C with [0, 1]. Since C is an order-separable chain,
it is order-isomorphic to a subset S of R (see e.g. Theorem 24 in Birkhoff
(1967, p. 200)). It follows that C with the order topology is homeomorphic
to S with its order topology.
The set S is dense in an interval S′ ⊇ S since S is order-dense-in-itself
(because C is). The interval S′ must be closed and bounded since it contains
its infimum and supremum (because C contains Y (0) and Y (1)). Since S
is order-complete (because C is), it must coincide with its closure, so that
S′ = S. Finally, S is non-trivial since C is neither empty nor a singleton. In
sum, we may identify C with a non-trivial closed and bounded interval of
R—without loss of generality, the unit interval [0, 1].
We may therefore treat Y as an increasing function [0, 1]→ [0, 1]. With
this simplification, it is straightforward to construct a sequence (Yn)n∈N with
the desired properties; we omit the details.40 
F.4 Proof of the implementability theorem (p. 16)
Fix an increasing Y : [0, 1] → Y. Embed its image Y ([0, 1]) in the chain
C ⊆ Y delivered by the approximation lemma in appendix F.3, and equip
C with the relative topology inherited from the order topology on Y. We
henceforth view Y as a function [0, 1] → C, and (with a minor abuse of
notation) view f and f3 as functions C ×R × [0, 1]→ R.
We seek a payment schedule P : [0, 1]→ R such that the direct mechanism
(Y, P ) is incentive-compatible. We do this first (step 1) under the assumption
that Y is continuous, then (step 2) show how continuity may be dropped.
Step 1: Suppose that Y is continuous. By the preference assumptions and
the existence lemma in the appendix F.1,41 there exists a transfer schedule
40A detailed and readable construction can be found in Cordeiro (2016).
41The first two sets of hypotheses in existence lemma are implied by the preference
assumptions. The measurability condition is satisfied because f(·, p, t), f3(·, p, t) and Y are
continuous, and f(y, p, ·) and f3(y, p, ·) are Borel-measurable (the former being continuous,
and the latter a derivative). (To complete the argument for measurability, deduce that
r 7→ f(Y (r), p, t) is continuous and that t 7→ f(Y (r), p, t) is Borel-measurable, so that
(r, t) 7→ f(Y (r), p, t) is (jointly) Borel-measurable, and thus t 7→ f(Y (t), p, t) is Borel-
measurable. Similarly for f3.)
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P : [0, 1]→ R such that the envelope formula holds with (say) VY,P (0) = 0:
VY,P (t) =
∫ t
0
f3(Y (s), P (s), s)ds for every t ∈ [0, 1],
where VY,P (t) := f(Y (t), P (t), t). We will show that (Y, P ) is incentive-
compatible.
Let U : [0, 1]2 → R be the mis-reporting payoff:
U(r, t) := f(Y (r), P (r), t) for all r, t ∈ [0, 1].
For r < t in [0, 1], define φr,t : [−r, 1− t]→ R to be the aggregate payoff of
types s ∈ [r, t] from (mis-)reporting s+m:
φr,t(m) :=
∫ t
r
U(s+m, s)ds for all m ∈ [−r, 1− t].
The model fits into the abstract setting of §2.1 by letting X := C ×R
and X(t) := (Y (t), P (t)), and the maintained assumptions are satisfied since
f3 exists and is bounded. We may therefore apply the converse envelope
theorem (p. 9): since (Y, P ) satisfies the envelope formula, the outer first-order
condition holds:
φ′r,t(0) =
d
dm
∫ t
r
U(s+m, s)ds
∣∣∣∣
m=0
= 0 for all r, t ∈ (0, 1).
It follows by the outer Spence–Mirrlees condition that( d
dm
)? ∫ t
r
U(s+m, s+ n)ds
∣∣∣∣
m=0
≥ 0
for all r < t in (0, 1) and n ∈ (0, 1−t). By change of variable, this is equivalent
to
D?φr,t(−n) =
( d
dm
)? ∫ t
r
U(s+m, s)ds
∣∣∣∣
m=−n
≥ 0
for all r < t in (0, 1) and n ∈ (0, 1− t).
The converse envelope theorem also implies that VY,P is absolutely con-
tinuous. f is continuous by Remark 2 (p. 14). Since Y , f and VY,P are
continuous and f(y, ·, t) is strictly monotone, P must also be continuous.42
42Suppose not: for some sequence (tn)n∈N in [0, 1] converging to t, limn→∞ P (tn) 6= P (t).
Then by continuity of Y and f and strict monotonicity of f(y, ·, t),
VY,P (tn) = f(Y (tn), P (tn), tn)→ f
(
Y (t), lim
n→∞
P (tn), t
)
6= f(Y (t), P (t), t) = VY,P (t),
contradicting the continuity of VY,P .
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The continuity of Y , P and f implies that U(·, t) is continuous for any
t ∈ [0, 1]. Furthermore, the continuity of Y and P and the equi-continuity of
{f3(·, ·, t)}t∈[0,1] imply that {U2(·, t)}t∈[0,1] is equi-continuous, and thus that
φr,t is continuous for any r < t in [0, 1].43
Now fix r < t in (0, 1). Since φr,t is continuous and satisfies D?φr,t ≥ 0 on
[−r, 0], it is increasing on [−r, 0] by the monotonicity lemma in appendix F.2.
A similar argument shows that it is decreasing on [0, 1− t].
It follows that for any r < t in [0, 1] and m ∈ [−r, 1− t],∫ t
r
[U(s, s)− U(s+m, s)]ds = φr,t(0)− φr,t(m) ≥ 0.
Thus for every m ∈ [0, 1], we have
U(s, s)− U(s+m, s) ≥ 0 for a.e. s ∈ [0, 1] ∩ [−m, 1−m].
Since VY,P (s) = U(s, s) and
s 7→ U(s+m, s) = f(Y (s+m), P (s+m), s)
are continuous for any m ∈ [0, 1], it follows that for every m ∈ [0, 1],
U(s, s)− U(s+m, s) ≥ 0 for every s ∈ [0, 1] ∩ [−m, 1−m].
Equivalently, U(t, t) ≥ U(r, t) for all r, t ∈ [0, 1], which is to say that (Y, P )
is incentive-compatible.
43Fix ε > 0; we seek a δ > 0 such that |m′ −m| < δ implies |φr,t(m′)− φr,t(m)| < ε.
Define ε1 := ε/2(t − r) > 0 and ε2 := ε/(t2 − r2) > 0. Since U(·, 0) is continuous on a
compact domain, it is uniformly continuous by the Heine–Cantor theorem (e.g. Theorem
4.19 in Rudin (1976))—thus we may find a δ1 > 0 such that |m′ −m| < δ1 implies
|U(s+m′, 0)− U(s+m, 0)| < ε1, uniformly over s ∈ [r, t]. A small variation on the same
theorem yields that the equi-continuity of {U2(·, s′)}s′∈[0,1] is uniform, so that we may
choose δ2 > 0 to ensure that |m′ −m| < δ2 implies |U2(s+m′, s′)− U2(s+m, s′)| < ε2
uniformly over s, s′ ∈ [r, t]. Let δ := min{δ1, δ2}; then by Lebesgue’s fundamental theorem
of calculus, |m′ −m| < δ implies
∣∣φr,t(m′)− φr,t(m)∣∣ ≤ ∫ t
r
∣∣U(s+m′, s)− U(s+m, s)∣∣ds
≤
∫ t
r
∣∣U(s+m′, 0)− U(s+m, 0)∣∣ds+ ∫ t
r
∫ s
0
∣∣U2(s+m′, s′)− U2(s+m, s′)∣∣ds′ds
<
∫ t
r
ε1ds+
∫ t
r
∫ s
0
ε2ds′ds = ε1(t− r) + ε2 12
(
t2 − r2
)
= ε2 +
ε
2 = ε.
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Step 2: Now drop the assumption that Y is continuous. By the order
assumptions and the approximation lemma in appendix F.3, there exists a
sequence (Yn)n∈N of continuous and increasing maps [0, 1]→ C converging
pointwise to Y , each of which satisfies Yn = Y on {0, 1}. At each n ∈ N, by
the previous argument, we may find a continuous Pn : [0, 1]→ R such that
(Yn, Pn) satisfies the envelope formula with
VYn,Pn(0) = f(Yn(0), Pn(0), 0) = 0.
Furthermore, (Yn, Pn) is incentive-compatible, i.e. Un(t, t) ≥ Un(r, t) for all
r, t ∈ [0, 1], where
Un(r, t) := f(Yn(r), Pn(r), t) for all r, t ∈ [0, 1] and n ∈ N.
It is obvious from incentive-compatibility that each Pn must be increasing.
Moreover, by the envelope formula, each Pn takes values in the compact
interval
[
p0, p1
]
, where p0 and p1 are defined by
f
(
Y (0), p0, 0
)
= 0 and f
(
Y (1), p1, 1
)
= sup
n∈N
∫ 1
0
f3(Yn(s), Pn(s), s)ds,
and p1 is well-defined since f3 is bounded. Thus by the Helly selection
theorem,44 there is a subsequence of (Pn)n∈N that converges pointwise to
some (increasing) P : [0, 1]→ R.
Along that subsequence, (Un)n∈N converges pointwise to the function
U(r, t) := f(Y (r), P (r), t) since f is continuous. Because the incentive-
compatibility inequalities are satisfied by each Un, they are satisfied in
the limit: U(t, t) ≥ U(r, t) for all r, t ∈ [0, 1]. Thus (Y, P ) is an incentive-
compatible direct mechanism. 
G Proof of Proposition 1 (p. 17)
The proof relies on a simple ‘non-decreasing’ comparative statics lemma.
Results along these lines are dimly known in the comparative statics literature,
but rarely seen in print.45
Lemma 5. Let X and T be partially ordered sets, and let f be a function
X × T → R. Call a decision rule X : T → X optimal iff
f(X(t), t) ≥ f(x, t) for all x ∈ X and t ∈ T .
If f is strictly single-crossing, then every optimal decision rule is non-
decreasing.
44See e.g. Rudin (1976, p. 167).
45An exception is Quah and Strulovici (2007, Proposition 5).
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Proof. Write . and , respectively, for the partial orders on X and on T .
Let X : T → X be optimal, and suppose toward a contradiction that there
are t ≺ t′ in T such that X(t′) < X(t). Since X(t) is optimal at parameter t,
we have f(X(t′), t) ≤ f(X(t), t). Because t ≺ t′ and X(t′) ≺ X(t), it follows
by strict single-crossing that f(X(t′), t′) < f(X(t), t′), a contradiction with
the optimality of X(t′) at parameter t′. 
Proof of Proposition 1. Let Y : [0, 1]→ Y be implementable, so that (Y, P )
is incentive-compatible for some payment schedule P : [0, 1] → R. Define
a tariff pi : Y ([0, 1]) → R by pi ◦ Y = P ; it is well-defined because by
incentive-compatibility and strict monotonicity of f(y, ·, t), Y (r) = Y (r′)
implies P (r) = P (r′). Define a function φ : Y ([0, 1])× [0, 1]→ R by φ(y, t) :=
f(y, pi(y), t). Take any t ∈ [0, 1] and y ∈ Y ([0, 1]), and observe that there
must be an r ∈ [0, 1] with Y (r) = y. Thus since (Y, P ) is incentive-compatible,
we have
φ(Y (t), t) = f(Y (t), pi(Y (t)), t) = f(Y (t), P (t), t)
≥ f(Y (r), P (r), t) = f(y, pi(y), t) = φ(y, t).
Since y ∈ Y ([0, 1]) and t ∈ [0, 1] were arbitrary, this shows that Y is an
optimal decision rule for objective φ. Since φ is strictly single-crossing by
the strict Spence–Mirrlees condition, it follows by Lemma 5 that Y is non-
decreasing. 
H The preference assumptions in selling information (§3.4)
In this appendix, we show that the continuity hypotheses in the preference
assumptions are satisfied in §3.4. We require two lemmata.
Lemma 6. Let Y be the set of Borel probability distributions with mean
µ0, equipped with the Blackwell informativeness order (as in §3.4). Give Y
the order topology, and let C ⊆ Y be a chain. If a sequence (yn)n∈N in C
converges to y ∈ C in the relative topology on C, then
sup
v+,v−:∆(Ω)→R
cont’s convex
s.t. |v+ − v−| ≤ 1
∣∣∣∣∣
∫
∆(Ω)
(
v+ − v−)d(yn − y)
∣∣∣∣∣ −→ 0 as n→∞.
Corollary 2. Under the same hypotheses,
sup
v:∆(Ω)→[−1,1]
cont’s convex
∣∣∣∣∣
∫
∆(Ω)
vd(yn − y)
∣∣∣∣∣ −→ 0 as n→∞.
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Proof of Lemma 6. Define d : Y × Y → R+ by
d(y, y′) := sup
v+,v−:∆(Ω)→R
cont’s convex
s.t. |v+ − v−| ≤ 1
∣∣∣∣∣
∫
∆(Ω)
(
v+ − v−)d(y − y′)∣∣∣∣∣.
(d is in fact a metric on Y .) Let (yn)n∈N be a sequence in C that converges to
some y ∈ C in the relative topology on C inherited from the order topology
on Y; we will show that d(yn, y) vanishes as n −→∞.
Let
Bε :=
{
y′ ∈ Y : d(y, y′) < ε}
denote the open d-ball of radius ε > 0 around y. Call I ⊆ Y an open order
interval iff either (1) I = {y′ ∈ Y : y′ < y+} for some y+ ∈ Y, or (2)
I = {y′ ∈ Y : y− < y′} for some y− ∈ Y, or (3) I = {y′ ∈ Y : y− < y′ < y+}
for some y− < y+ in Y . Open order intervals are obviously open in the order
topology on Y.
It suffices to show that for every ε > 0, there is an open order interval
Iε ⊆ Y such that y ∈ Iε ⊆ Bε. For then given any ε > 0, we know that yn
lies in Iε ∩ C ⊆ Bε for all sufficiently large n ∈ N because (in the relative
topology on C) Iε ∩ C is an open set containing y and yn −→ y. And this
clearly implies that d(yn, y) vanishes as n −→∞.
So fix an ε > 0; we will construct an open order interval I ⊆ Y such that
y ∈ I ⊆ Bε. There are three cases.
Case 1: y′ < y for no y′ ∈ Y. Let y++ ∈ Y be such that y < y++. Define
y+ := (1− ε/2)y + (ε/2)y++ ∈ Y,
and let
I :=
{
y′ ∈ Y : y′ < y+}.
We have y < y+ and thus y ∈ I since∫
∆(Ω)
vd
(
y+ − y) = ε2
∫
∆(Ω)
vd
(
y++ − y)
is weakly (strictly) positive for every (some) continuous and convex v :
∆(Ω) → R by y < y++. For I ⊆ Bε, it suffices that d
(
y, y+
)
< ε, and this
holds because
d
(
y, y+
)
= ε2 supv+,v−:∆(Ω)→R
cont’s convex
s.t. |v+ − v−| ≤ 1
∣∣∣∣∣
∫
∆(Ω)
(
v+ − v−)d(y − y′)∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ ε2 < ε.
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Case 2: y < y′ for no y′ ∈ Y . This case is analogous to the first: choose a
y−− ∈ Y such that y−− < y, let y− := (1− ε/2)y + (ε/2)y−−, and take
I :=
{
y′ ∈ Y : y− < y′} .
The same arguments as in Case 1 yield y ∈ I ⊆ Bε.
Case 3: y′ < y < y′′ for some y′, y′′ ∈ Y. Define y+ as in Case 1 and y−
as in Case 2, and let
I :=
{
y′ ∈ Y : y− < y′ < y+}.
We have y ∈ I ⊆ Bε by the same arguments as in Cases 1 and 2. 
Lemma 7. For any continuous function c : ∆(Ω)→ R and any ε > 0, there
are continuous convex w+, w− : ∆(Ω)→ R such that w := w+−w− satisfies
sup
µ∈∆(Ω)
|c(µ)− w(µ)| < ε.
Proof. Write W for the space of functions ∆(Ω)→ R that can be written
as the difference of continuous convex functions. Since the sum of convex
functions is convex, W is a vector space. It is furthermore closed under
pointwise multiplication (Hartman, 1959, p. 708), and thus an algebra.
Clearly W contains the constant functions, and it separates points in the
sense that for any distinct µ, µ′ ∈ ∆(Ω) there is a w ∈ W with w(µ) 6= w(µ′).
It follows by the Stone–Weierstrass theorem46 that W is dense in the space
of continuous functions ∆(Ω)→ R when the latter has the sup metric, which
is what we wished to prove. 
With the lemmata in hand, we can establish the continuity hypotheses.
Proposition 5. Consider the setting in §3.4. Let C ⊆ Y be a chain, and
equip it with the relative topology inherited from the order topology on Y.
Then f(·, ·, 0) is continuous on C ×R, and {f3(·, ·, t)}t∈[0,1] is equi-continuous
on C ×R.
Proof. Clearly f(y, ·, 0) is continuous and {f3(y, ·, t)}t∈[0,1] is equi-continuous
for any y ∈ Y. Since f(y, p, t) is additively separable in y and p, it remains
only to show that for any p ∈ R and any chain C ⊆ Y , f(·, p, 0) is continuous
on C and {f3(·, p, t)}t∈[0,1] is equi-continuous on C.
46See e.g. Folland (1999, Theorem 4.45).
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To that end, fix a p ∈ R and a chain C ⊆ Y , and take a sequence (yn)n∈N
in C converging to some y ∈ C in the relative topology on C induced by the
order topology on Y; we must show that |f(yn, p, 0)− f(y, p, 0)| and
sup
t∈[0,1]
|f3(yn, p, t)− f3(y, p, t)|
both vanish as n −→∞. The former is easy: since V (·, 0) is continuous (hence
bounded) and convex, we have
|f(yn, p, 0)− f(y, p, 0)| =
∣∣∣∣∣
∫
∆(Ω)
V (·, 0)d(yn − y)
∣∣∣∣∣
≤
(
sup
µ∈∆(Ω)
|V (µ, 0)|
)
× sup
v:∆(Ω)→[−1,1]
cont’s convex
∣∣∣∣∣
∫
∆(Ω)
vd(yn − y)
∣∣∣∣∣
for every n ∈ N, and the right-hand side vanishes as n −→∞ by Corollary 2.
For the latter, fix an ε > 0; we seek an N ∈ N such that
|f3(yn, p, t)− f3(y, p, t)| < ε for all t ∈ [0, 1] and n ≥ N .
For each t ∈ [0, 1], since V2(·, t) is continuous, Lemma 7 permits us to
choose continuous and convex functions w+t , w−t : ∆(Ω)→ R such that wt :=
w+t −w−t is uniformly ε/3-close to V2(·, t). Write K for the constant bounding
V2, and observe that {wt}t∈[0,1] is uniformly bounded by K ′ := K + ε/3. By
Lemma 6, there is an N ∈ N such that
sup
v+,v−:∆(Ω)→R
cont’s convex
s.t. |v+ − v−| ≤ 1
∣∣∣∣∣
∫
∆(Ω)
(
v+ − v−)d(yn − y)
∣∣∣∣∣ < ε/3K ′ for all n ≥ N ,
and thus
sup
t∈[0,1]
∣∣∣∣∣
∫
∆(Ω)
wtd(yn − y)
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ K ′ × ε/3K ′ = ε/3 for n ≥ N .
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Hence for every t ∈ [0, 1] and n ≥ N , we have
|f3(yn, p, t)− f3(y, p, t)|
=
∣∣∣∣∣
∫
∆(Ω)
V2(·, t)d(yn − y)
∣∣∣∣∣
≤
∣∣∣∣∣
∫
∆(Ω)
wtd(yn − y)
∣∣∣∣∣+
∣∣∣∣∣
∫
∆(Ω)
[V2(·, t)− wt]d(yn − y)
∣∣∣∣∣
≤
∣∣∣∣∣
∫
∆(Ω)
wtd(yn − y)
∣∣∣∣∣+ 2 supµ∈∆(Ω)|V2(µ, t)− wt(µ)|
≤ ε/3 + 2ε/3 = ε,
as desired. 
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